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Abstract: This study examines how tax progressivity affects entrepreneurial dynamics in 18 countries.
The results show that increased downside progressivity has a positive influence on the transition
rate from nascent entrepreneurship to established business ownership. In addition, only downside
progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates is related to the transition ratio, implying that it is
marginal tax rates, and not average tax rates, that are used in the entrepreneurial decision-making
process. This paper contributes to our understanding of entrepreneurial dynamics and the effect of
tax progressivity on the transition from nascent entrepreneurship to established business ownership.
Keywords: entrepreneurial dynamics; tax progressivity; transition ratio; panel data
1. Introduction
Entrepreneurship (innovation) as a catalyst for economic growth can be traced in the economics
literature to Ref [1], and encouraging entrepreneurship has kept the attention of policymakers to the
present day. Taxes have been cited as a potential boost or deterrent to entrepreneurship at least since the
1940s (e.g., [2]). Therefore, an existing literature on the relationship between taxes and entrepreneurship
is unclear [3]. According to Clingingsmith and Shane [4], while the deterrent effects are associated
with risk taking explanation (i.e., the asymmetric taxation of profits and losses), the boosting effects are
associated with the tax avoidance story. It should be also noted that tax systems can differ in their
progressivity, and designing a tax structure is a very complex task due to their effects on different
individuals such as employees, business owners, and so on [5,6]. However, from a policy perspective,
assuming that any changes to the tax code must be revenue-neutral, it is only the tax structure that
can be changed. These tax code changes can include items such as proportional or progressive tax
rates, incentives for investments in innovation, loss-carryforwards that act as insurance for risk-averse
prospective entrepreneurs, and tax code simplifications that decrease the cost of tax compliance. In this
paper, we study the impact of tax progressivity on entrepreneurial dynamics. Specifically, we study
how the convexity of marginal and average tax rates above and below-average income affects the
transition from nascent entrepreneur to business ownership.
Early theoretical studies that build on the probability approach to risk theory show that higher
tax progressivity leads to increased entrepreneurial entry [7–10]. This is due to the ease of tax
avoidance by the self-employed when high progressive tax rates increase the financial incentive for tax
avoidance. Higher tax progressivity also leads to increased entrepreneurial entry by offering insurance
for risk-averse entrepreneurs against uninsured idiosyncratic risk (’insurance’ effect, e.g., [7,8,11].
The rationale is that if the full offset of losses are deductible from their future tax duties, which leaves
the return per unit of risk-taking unchanged, then it will encourage entrepreneurial activity. However,
the yield can be reduced at a greater percentage under conditions of taxation without full or partial
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loss offset. Therefore, the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry depends on the provisions in the tax law
based on the aforementioned possible cases of loss deduction.
Later theories of the effect of tax progressivity on the decision to become an “entrepreneur” build
on simple discrete-choice examples, such as probit models for entrepreneurial entry [12,13], predicting
that progressive tax rates with imperfect loss offsets can discourage entrepreneurial entry by increasing
the average tax burden. The rationale is that in progressive tax rates, successful entrepreneurs have a
larger share of payoffs than less successful entrepreneurs, and thus this asymmetric treatment leads
to decreased entrepreneurial entry. These outcomes imply the possibility of a ‘success’ effect, which
means that entrepreneurial entry is reduced with an increase in tax progressivity. In recent years,
however, both micro- and macro-level empirical literature [14–17] have provided mixed evidence for
this relationship. Consequently, the following theoretical literature has examined why tax progressivity
can have positive [7], negative [18,19], or ambiguous effects [20] on entrepreneurial entry.
Despite these analyses and various cross-national panel examinations, little is known about the
relationship between tax progressivity and the transition from nascent entrepreneurship to established
business ownership. Two recent studies, [16] and [17], both explored the effect of tax progressivity on
entrepreneurial entry at the macro level using cross-national panel analysis. While [16] examines the
effect of tax progressivity on nascent entrepreneurship, [17] explores the effect of tax progressivity on
entrepreneurial activity by distinguishing two types of entrepreneurship–nascent entrepreneurship and
established business ownership. Both studies found a negative association between tax progressivity
and nascent entrepreneurship at higher incomes. However, neither of them examine the effect of
tax progressivity on the entrepreneurial process by synthesizing the transition between nascent
entrepreneurship and new business ownership. As noted by [21] (p. 946), “ . . . a key transition in
the entrepreneurial process is that from nascent entrepreneurship to new business ownership, i.e.,
the transition from taking steps to starting a business to actually creating an operational firm.”
A key challenge faced in the literature has been to develop a concrete measure of “entrepreneurial
activity” [22,23]. This paper is focused on the transition phase, when nascent entrepreneurs develop
into operational businesses. This is measured using the transition ratio, the proportion of new business
owners divided by the proportion of nascent entrepreneurs in the previous year. Therefore, the purpose
of the current study is two-fold. First, it attempts to identify the effect of tax progressivity on the
entrepreneurial process. Second, the most significant contribution of the present study is that it
proposes to test a new theory on the aforementioned association. The main reason for this is that
earlier theoretical and empirical works have been unable to provide much guidance on the effect
of tax progressivity due to the competing predictions of the ‘insurance’ and ‘success’ effect, and no
clear theory for when each might apply. Moreover, as Ref [16] (p. 171) note, “Oddly the bulk of the
empirical evidence on the impact of average tax rates points to a positive effect on entrepreneurship
(self-employment). This difference in the effects of average and marginal tax rates suggests that tax
progressivity may play an important role.” This quote serves as motivation for the research questions:
Does tax progressivity play an essential role in entrepreneurial dynamics; and are marginal or average
tax rates important when examining nascent entrepreneurs’ decisions to start a business?
The empirical tests, using macro-level panel data for 18 countries over the period 2002–2007,
show that downside progressivity, which is progressivity measured at income levels below the average
level of income, have a positive impact on the transition rate from nascent entrepreneurship to
established business ownership. However, there is no significant relationship between the transition
ratio [21] and upside progressivity, which is progressivity measured at income levels above the average
level of income. In addition, downside progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates is significantly
related to the transition ratio, but downside progressivity calculated using average tax rates is not
related to the transition ratio. This implies that entrepreneurs are using marginal tax rates in their
decision-making process and not average tax rates.
This contributes to our understanding of entrepreneurial dynamics. Previous research has found
that upside progressivity impacts nascent entrepreneurship negatively [16,17], and progressivity has
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no impact on established business ownership [17]. We find that the conversion rate from nascent
entrepreneur to established business ownership is positively related to downside progressivity.
Thus, a clearer picture of entrepreneurial dynamics develops. High upside progressivity dampens
entrepreneurial enthusiasm. However, some entrepreneurs are not dissuaded from beginning the
entrepreneurial process, becoming nascent entrepreneurs. For this group, a key factor in advancing to
the next stage of entrepreneurship, established business owner, is downside progressivity.
These results have implications for policymakers interested in encouraging entrepreneurship.
Decreasing upside progressivity encourages nascent entrepreneurs to investigate the possibility
of starting a business. Increasing downside progressivity increases the transition rate from
nascent entrepreneur to established business owner. Also, policymakers need to make sure that
marginal tax rates are clear to taxpayers, as they are more important than average tax rates in
entrepreneurial dynamics.
In Section 2, we develop theory and hypotheses, Section 3 presents the data and methodology,
followed by the empirical tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the
results, limitations of the current research, and implications for practice and future research.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
There are two dimensions to taxes: tax progressivity and tax rates [16,17,20,24–27]. The sections
that follow examine each dimension separately, and the impact they have on entrepreneurial dynamics.
2.1. Tax Progressivity
When an employee is considering giving up the stability of employment for the uncertainty of
self-employment (entrepreneurship), they will consider the effect of taxes on their future earnings. If a
conservative entrepreneur is in a high tax progressivity environment, they will be primarily concerned
with downside progressivity, which is progressivity below the average income level. High downside
progressivity means lower tax rates in the initial phases of the enterprise. In a high tax progressivity
environment, the initial tax rate faced by the entrepreneur is very low, but will increase steeply with
success. A similar entrepreneur in a flat or low progressivity tax structure is faced with a higher initial
tax rate due to less downside progressivity. As income increases, the tax rate increases only slightly
due to the low progressivity.
Upside progressivity applies to applicable taxes above the average income level. This is likely
many years after the start of the entrepreneurial process, which means it is often not within the
entrepreneur’s forecast horizon. Due to an entrepreneur’s focus on the short-term, only downside
progressivity is used in the decision-making process.
When comparing the entrepreneur in the high progressivity case and the entrepreneur in the low
progressivity environment, high progressivity is preferred. This is because of the low initial tax rate.
Due to the struggle for survival by early-stage entrepreneurs, low tax rates can mean the difference
between success and failure when cash is at its scarcest. Low initial tax rates are also advantageous
simply due to the time value of money. Low initial rates in exchange for higher rates at a later point in
time mean the present value of the after-tax earnings stream is higher.
An optimistic entrepreneur will be less affected by the progressivity of tax rates when deciding
to become an entrepreneur. The benefits outlined above from low initial tax rates that exist in the
early stages in the high progressivity setting will still benefit the entrepreneur, but the increased tax
rates might deter the entrepreneur at the higher income levels. This is a paradox of high progressivity,
low initial tax rates that might only apply for a brief period, but high tax rates then apply for many years
in the long run. Thus, any initial benefit of lower taxes is quickly evaporated, and year-after-year higher
taxes are a deterrent to entrepreneurial entry. However, this also assumes a somewhat symmetrical tax
structure, where downside progressivity and upside progressivity are approximately equal. The ideal
situation for the entrepreneur is large downside progressivity and small upside progressivity. In this
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case, the entrepreneur gets the benefit of low initial tax rates in the early stages, and does not have to
pay extraordinarily high taxes if the venture is a booming success.
The transition ratio used in this study measures the annual transition rate from nascent to
established entrepreneur. Based on the above discussion, we predict that downside progressivity will
be positively related to the transition ratio, and upside progressivity will be negatively related to the
transition ratio. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Downside progressivity will be positively related to the transition ratio.
Hypothesis 2. Upside progressivity will be negatively related to the transition ratio.
2.2. Tax Rates
Tax researchers discuss two distinct groups of tax features: actual (“objective”) and perceived
(“subjective”) [28–30]. The idea stems from the tax perception literature, which claims that for
measuring, analyzing, and explaining the reaction of individuals to taxation, perceived, or subjective,
tax features are more essential [28]. These studies stress the importance of taxes on individual
decision-making, but they do not mention which tax rates (average or marginal) are relevant.
Taxpayers can use average or marginal tax rates in their decision-making process [31]. Published
marginal tax rates that the individual will pay are known ex-ante, whereas average tax rates are known
only ex-post after actual taxes have been paid. It is important to examine both of these to determine
which tax rates are used by potential entrepreneurs when deciding to pursue self-employment
(entrepreneurship). The heterogeneity in perception (e.g., some individuals might use average tax
rates and some marginal tax rates) makes it difficult to test which tax rates are relevant for individual
decision-makers when using data collected by surveys or interviews.
Using a laboratory experiment on investment decisions, [31] suggests that it is incorrect to assume
marginal tax rates are used exclusively in individual decision-making. In Ref [31]’s experiments,
individuals assumed the average tax rates ’as if’ they were the marginal tax rates, and tended to be
confused when the marginal tax rates were less explicit. Additionally, in the tax psychology literature,
some of the prior studies emphasize that individuals overestimate their marginal tax rates (e.g., [32,33]).
It has been proposed that either marginal or average tax rates can be used to measure progressivity.
However, average tax rates can only be calculated ex-post, whereas marginal tax rates are available
ex-ante when the decision is being made. Average tax rates are based on actual taxes paid and will
only be known after the change to self-employment has been made, too late to use in decision making.
Therefore, in the empirical tests, average tax rates and progressivity measured using average tax rates
will not be related to the conversion ratio. However, marginal tax rates and progressivity measured
using marginal tax rates will be related to the conversion ratio. This leads to the third hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. Nascent entrepreneurs use marginal tax rates and not average tax rates, when deciding whether
to transition from nascent entrepreneur to established business owner.
Tax rates, whether average or marginal, have a negative or positive or effect on the labor
supply [34,35]. Increased taxes reduce net earnings received, which causes either a decreased supply
of labor due to the decreased cost of leisure (substitution effect) or an increased supply of labor if
the worker desires to maintain their income level (income effect). This is also true of prospective
entrepreneurs, with future taxation reducing the payoffs from their efforts [36,37]. As the current
study is concerned with the effect of tax progressivity on the decision to give up employment for
self-employment, the level of tax rates are included, but no predictions are made regarding their impact
on the entrepreneur’s decision.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data and Sample
In order to examine the relationship between tax progressivity and the transition to
entrepreneurship, we gather country data from several independent sources, including [21,38–45].
The dependent variable is the transition ratio, and the primary independent variables are tax
progressivity and tax rates. There are a myriad other factors influencing entrepreneurial entry.
Country-level control variables that are considered influential factors of entrepreneurial entry are
added to the regression model in line with [16] and [17]. Control variables included in the models are
income per capita, start-up costs, quality of credit information, tertiary education, risk, subsidies, and
inflation. The variables are described in Table 1.
The final dataset covers 18 countries over the period 2002–2007. The sample was constructed by
matching the transition ratio from [21] with tax rate data for all available countries. The absence of the
ideal data is limits both the country and time coverage of our empirical analysis. Ref [21] calculate the
transition ratio using GEM individual-level data. GEM is an organization of teams from countries
around the world, primarily affiliated with academic institutions, which conducts representative
surveys of the adult population annually.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3584 6 of 21
Table 1. Variables, Descriptions, and Sources.
Variable Variable Description Mean SD Min Max Source
Dependent Variable
Transition Ratio (Tran
Ratio)
The transition ratio is calculated by dividing the proportion of new business owners by the
proportion of nascent entrepreneurs in the previous year. 0.44 0.25 0.00 1.42 (1)
Independent Variables
Downside Progressivity
(DownProgressM)
Downside progressivity (with subscript M) is calculated as the difference between tax rates at
100% and 67% of average earnings using marginal tax rates. 3.40 5.77 −6.49 20.00 (2)
Upside Progressivity
(UpProgressM)
Upside progressivity (with subscript M) is calculated as the difference between tax rates at 167%
and 100% of average earnings using marginal tax rates. 6.39 7.17 −12.68 23.80 (2)
Downside Progressivity
(DownProgressA)
Downside progressivity (with subscript A) is calculated as the difference between tax rates at
100% and 67% of average earnings using average tax rates. 3.97 1.78 0.56 7.98 (2)
Upside Progressivity
(UpProgressA)
Upside progressivity (with subscript A) is calculated as the difference between tax rates at 167%
and 100% of average earnings using average tax rates. 6.42 2.31 2.85 12.64 (2)
Tax67M Net personal marginal tax rates of single workers with no children at 67% of average earnings. 35.90 9.28 18.75 61.41 (2)
Tax100M Net personal marginal tax rates of single workers with no children at 100% of average earnings. 39.31 9.72 22.88 59.91 (2)
Tax167M Net personal marginal tax rates of single workers with no children at 167% of average earnings. 45.69 9.43 26.95 62.28 (2)
Tax67A Net personal average tax rates of single workers with no children at 67% of average earnings. 24.84 7.15 5.89 37.00 (2)
Tax100A Net personal average tax rates of single workers with no children at 100% of average earnings. 28.82 7.22 13.87 43.37 (2)
Tax167A Net personal average tax rates of single workers with no children at 167% of average earnings. 35.24 7.61 21.68 50.00 (2)
Control Variables
Income GDP per capita, in log. 10.59 0.18 10.10 11.08 (3)
Start-Up Cost
(Start Cost) Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) 5.87 6.23 0.00 22.80 (3)
Risk Investment Risk (0 = very low to 6 = very high) 5.41 0.68 3.17 6.00 (4)
Tertiary Education
(Education) School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 67.58 12.51 49.79 97.94 (3)
Credit Information
(Credit Info) Depth of credit information index (0 = low to 8 = high) 6.43 1.11 4.00 8.00 (3)
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual%) 2.46 1.88 −1.69 8.78 (3)
Subsidies Subsidies and other transfers (% of expense) 55.56 16.75 15.87 81.24 (3)
Notes: For all variables, n = 102; Subscripts denote Marginal (M) or Average (A) tax rates; Sources: (1) [21]; (2) [38]; (3) Ref [40–45]; (4) [39].
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The transition ratio is not available for all years and countries. The missing values are not imputed
into the transition ratio, as it is the key dependent variable in the current analysis. After eliminating
observations with missing values, the final sample comprises 108 observations of the variables of
interest. The list of the countries included in the model is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Countries Included in the Analysis.
Australia Germany Norway
Belgium Iceland Slovenia
Canada Ireland Spain
Denmark Italy Sweden
Finland Japan UK
France Netherlands USA
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for the key variables used in the empirical
tests. There is considerable variation in tax progressivity and the transition ratio within and between
countries, which enables us to perform empirical analysis on the tax variables and entrepreneurial
dynamics. For instance, the transition ratio, the percentage of 18-to 64-year-olds in the population
switching from nascent entrepreneurship to established entrepreneurs, ranges from a minimum of 0%
to a maximum of 1.42%. The mean value for the transition ratio is 0.44%. Iceland, Belgium, and France
all had a zero transition ratio in 2004 and 2005, respectively. The highest transition ratios were in Japan
at 1.42 in 2004, and Spain at 1.41 in 2006. The net personal marginal tax rate varies from 18.75% (Japan
in 2003 and 2004, at 67% of average earnings) to 62.28% (Denmark from 2004 to 2007, at 167% of average
earnings), while the net personal average tax rate varies from 5.89% (Ireland 2007, at 67% of average
earnings) to 50% (Germany 2003, at 167% of average earnings). There is considerable variability in
downside progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates, from low downside progressivity of −6.5
in Belgium in 2004 through 2007 to a high of 20.0 in Sweden in 2007. There is even greater variability
in upside progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates, from −12.7 in Germany in 2005 to 23.8 in
Sweden in 2004. There is less variability in downside progressivity calculated using average tax rates,
from low downside progressivity of 0.56 in The Netherlands in 2005 to a high of 7.98 in Ireland in 2007.
There is less variability in upside progressivity calculated using average tax rates than calculated using
marginal tax rates, from 2.85 in Japan in 2002 to 12.64 in Ireland in 2005.
3.2. Dependent Variable
The transition ratio is computed based on the approach developed by [21], who developed a
new method to measure entrepreneurial dynamics. The transition ratio measures the transformation
from someone doing preparatory work to start a business (nascent entrepreneur) to establishing
a functioning business (new business owner). Nascent entrepreneurship (NE) is measured as the
percentage of adults that have taken actions to start a business as an owner or co-owner. In addition,
the nascent entrepreneur has not received any income from the venture, or their income has been
received for less than three months. A new business owner (NBO) is one who has received wages,
profits, or in-kind payments from their new venture for more than three months, but less than 1.5 years.
The transition ratio is calculated as NBO from the current year divided by NE from the previous year.
TRt = NBOt/NEt−1 (1)
The transition ratio can be calculated only when a country has data for at least two consecutive
years between 2001 and 2008. The authors of [21] tested the transition ratio’s reliability and validity
over numerous countries and years.
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Table 3. Correlations and Descriptive Statistics.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1. Tran Ratio 1.00
2. DownProgressM 0.04 1.00
3. UpProgressM 0.15 −0.38 * 1.00
4. DownProgressA −0.26 * −0.09 −0.14 1.00
5. UpProgressA 0.03 0.03 0.58 * 0.34 * 1.00
6. Tax67M −0.30 * −0.23 * −0.19 0.36 * 0.10 1.00
7. Tax100M −0.26 * 0.37 * −0.41 * 0.29 * 0.12 0.82 * 1.00
8. Tax167M −0.16 0.10 0.34 * 0.20 * 0.56 * 0.69 * 0.72 * 1.00
9. Tax67A −0.24 * 0.14 −0.20 * −0.09 −0.07 0.79 * 0.84 * 0.71 * 1.00
10. Tax100A −0.30 * 0.12 −0.23 * 0.16 0.02 0.87 * 0.90 * 0.76 * 0.97 * 1.00
11. Tax167A −0.28 * 0.12 −0.04 0.26 * 0.32 * 0.86 * 0.89 * 0.89 * 0.90 * 0.95 * 1.00
12. Income 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.34 * 0.05 0.06 0.18 −0.04 −0.04 0.07 1.00
13. Start Cost 0.03 −0.13 −0.18 0.14 −0.12 0.11 0.03 −0.11 −0.07 −0.04 −0.07 −0.41 * 1.00
14. Risk 0.00 0.01 0.08 −0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.00 1.00
15. Education 0.06 0.18 0.23 * −0.07 0.25 * 0.03 0.13 0.31 * 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.18 −0.31 * 0.03 1.00
16. Credit Info 0.10 −0.21 * −0.16 0.10 −0.19 −0.27 * −0.38 * −0.51 * −0.44 * −0.41 * −0.44 * 0.23 * −0.14 0.00 −0.20 * 1.00
17. Inflation −0.11 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.03 1.00
18. Subsidies 0.13 −0.14 −0.33 * −0.08 −0.34 * 0.25 * 0.16 −0.08 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.04 −0.06 −0.01 −0.17 1.00
Notes: Subscripts denote Marginal (M) or Average (A) tax rates. * Level of significance is 5%.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3584 9 of 21
3.3. Independent Variables
The main variables of interest in the empirical analysis are measures of tax progressivity. The two tax
progressivity variables were developed by [16], “downside progressivity,” and “upside’ progressivity.”
Downside and upside progressivity are calculated using both marginal and average tax rates. Therefore,
there are four progressivity measures: downside and upside progressivity based on marginal tax
rates, and downside and upside progressivity based on average tax rates. These measures have been
commonly used to make cross-country comparisons of the entrepreneurial process [16,17].
Downside progressivity is calculated as the difference between the net personal tax rate at 100%
of average earnings in the country and the net personal tax rate at 67% of average earnings in the
country. Upside progressivity is calculated as the difference between the net personal tax rate at 167%
of average earnings in the country and the net personal tax rate at 100% of average earnings.
Tax rates used in the empirical tests are taken from the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development [38]. The tax rates used are net personal average and marginal income tax rates for
incomes matching 67%, 100%, and 167% of average earnings. Previous research shows that tax rates
might have a significant negative effect on entrepreneurship [12,13,46,47], a significant positive effect
on entrepreneurship [24,36,48–51] or may not have a significant effect on entrepreneurship [52–55].
3.4. Control Variables
3.4.1. Income
The income measure, GDP per capita, is taken from Ref [40]. It is based on purchasing power
parity in constant 2011 international dollars. We control for income as Ref [56] and Ref [57] emphasize
that theoretically, income has an ambiguous effect on entrepreneurial entry, while other studies suggest
that there exists a U-shaped relation between income and entrepreneurial activity [58,59].
While income can have a positive impact on entrepreneurial entry due to higher aggregate
demand [16], it can also have a negative impact on entrepreneurial entry due to greater capital per
worker and larger company size [60]. The negative association between income and entrepreneurial
activity has been found in several studies [58,61–63].
3.4.2. Start-Up Costs
The start-up cost control variable is taken from the Ref [41]. It corresponds to the cost of business
start-up procedures, which is measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) per capita.
Start-up costs are an important control variable, as they may discourage entrepreneurship [64–66].
3.4.3. Credit Information
The index for the quality of credit information control variable is taken from Ref [42]. The index
for the quality of credit information ranges from zero to eight, with zero indicating low quality of credit
information and with eight indicating high quality of credit information. We control for the quality of
credit information, because high-quality credit information can minimize the liquidity constraint and
help entrepreneurs to access money that creditors have available [16,17,67–69].
3.4.4. Education
The human capital control variable is tertiary education, which corresponds to the level of education
(% gross enrollment ratio) and is taken from Ref [43]. Tertiary education refers to education beyond
the secondary level. We control for human capital, as it can have positive effect on entrepreneurial
entry due to higher opportunity cost and wage earnings of being an entrepreneur [66,70–73]. However,
human capital has also been shown to have a negative effect [74], and no significant effect [75–77].
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3.4.5. Risk
The risk control variable is taken from [39]. The effect of risk on entrepreneurial entry is ambiguous.
While [16] find a negative relationship between the risk factor and entrepreneurial entry, [17] finds a
positive relationship between the two variables.
3.4.6. Subsidies
The subsidies control variable is taken from Ref [44]. The subsidies variable corresponds to
subsidies, grants, and other social benefits, measured as a percentage of total cash payments for
providing goods and services operated by the government. Ref [16] empirically found a negative effect
of subsidies on entrepreneurial entry.
3.4.7. Inflation
The inflation control variable is taken from Ref [45]. It corresponds to the rate of price change in
the economy as a whole, which is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator
(the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency). The results of previous
research are mixed, as inflation may encourage entrepreneurial entry [78], although its influence can
be negative [57,79,80] or can have no significant effect on entrepreneurial entry [81].
3.5. Model Specification
Following previous research [16,17] to examine the relationship between tax progressivity and
entrepreneurial dynamics, the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Generalized Method-of-Moments (GMM)
estimator is used [82]. This estimator has been employed in several recent entrepreneurship
studies [83–86]. Additionally, the GMM estimator is specifically considered for small T and large N
panels, as we are particularly interested in many countries and few years. We follow the guidance in
Ref [87], as the GMM estimator has numerous advantages over other methods when the dependent
variable in the model partly depends on its own past realizations, predictors may not be strictly
exogenous (i.e., they can be correlated with past or current error terms), and heteroscedasticity or
autocorrelation within individuals (but not across individuals) is assumed to exist.
In general, three main econometric complications can be solved by employing a GMM
estimator [88]. The first advantage of this method is that it can account for unobserved country-specific
effects, which reduce the probability that model estimation is subject to omitted variable bias due to
unobservable heterogeneity [89,90]. Second, the GMM estimator utilizes lags to create instruments for
considering the exogenous components of feasibly endogenous independent variables [87,91], which
lessens the endogeneity concerns and their correlation with the error terms. Third, there is a potential
autoregression process in the data due to the dynamic nature of the decision to become an entrepreneur.
Using a model with lagged dependent variables controls for the possible reverse causality.
The GMM estimator is given by Equation (1). The model uses year dummies to capture
macroeconomic shocks and country fixed-effects for differences in country-specific effects
Transition_Ratioit = β1Transition_Ratioit−1 + β2Tax_progressivityit + β3Controlsit + uit (2)
where in each country i at time t, Transition_Ratioit captures entrepreneurial entry, Transition_Ratioit-1
is the lagged dependent variable in the current model, Tax_progressivityit denotes the measure of
tax progressivity, and β are parameters to be estimated. Control variables defined in the variable
measurement section are added to the model with Controlsit. In equation (1), the error term, uit,
contains the unobserved country-specific effects that are independent and identically distributed over
the countries, νt, and observation specific errors, eit, which are given by
uit = vt + eit (3)
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It is not appropriate to estimate dynamic panel models with lagged dependent variables using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE) [92], as the correlation
between lagged dependent variable and unobserved country-specific effects can lead to “dynamic
panel bias” [93]. The initial estimator suggested by Ref [82] was adjusted for dynamic panel data
models by first-differencing the data to remove any unobserved country-specific effects. However,
the first-difference GMM estimator has a disadvantage because it does not use the cross-sectional
information reflected in the differences between countries by removing unobserved country-specific
effects. Therefore, we use the system GMM estimator [94,95] instead of the difference GMM
estimator [82]. The system GMM estimator deals with time-invariant regressors in the model
and accounts for potential endogeneity, as persistence of the dependent variable (transition ratio) could
cause a critical weak instrument problem in difference GMM models [87]. However, in the system
GMM estimator, the corresponding level of lagged variables are utilized as instruments in difference
regressions, while the corresponding level of lagged differences are utilized as instruments in the
level regressions.
Two tests were used in order to examine potential misspecification of the models employed.
The Hansen J-test [96] of overidentifying restrictions is applied as a specification test in order to check
the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. The AR (2) [82] test is applied as
a second-order serial correlation test to verify that the differenced errors are not serially autocorrelated.
There is no validity problem, as the Hansen J-test and AR (2) tests failed to reject the null hypothesis.
Additionally, the Wald χ2 test serves as a test of overall model fit, showing a good fit for the model.
As per previous literature [16,17], tax rate (net personal marginal tax rate and average tax rate) and
tax progressivity are treated as endogenous variables due to potential two-way causality between them
and the dependent variable. Since selecting proper contemporaneous instruments is a challenging
task, the suggestions made by Ref [95] were followed; the t-2 lagged values of the dependent variable
and t-1 lagged values of all endogenous variables were used as instruments. Numerous recent studies
have used a similar method to address endogeneity concerns [89,97,98]. We follow the superiority
of collapsed instruments proposed by Ref [87] in determining proper contemporaneous instruments,
as all endogenous variables are collapsed in our model to limit the instrument count. This is done to
keep the number of instruments lower than the number of countries, because including an extreme
number of instruments may result in finite-sample bias, fail the power of Hansen J-test, and cause
severely downwardly biased standard errors [87].
The data was transformed using orthogonal deviations, enabling us to represent valid instruments.
Following Ref [87], we use a robust two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite-sample
correction [99] to avoid downwardly biased standard errors. We use the ‘xtabond2’ routine in STATA
version 13 to attain the empirical estimations.
3.6. Robustness Strategy
To measure whether the results of the baseline model are robust to other model selections,
tests were conducted by adding additional variables from previous research [16,17]. Start-up costs and
income were added as endogenous variables to the baseline model. Exogenous variables that were
significant in the studies mentioned above were also added to the baseline model. These variables:
time dummies, credit information, tertiary education, and risk function as instruments for themselves
(“IV style”) in our robustness tests.
4. Results
Dynamic Panel System GMM Baseline Model Results.
Table 4 presents the results of our baseline two-step system GMM estimation for tax progressivity
and entrepreneurial dynamics, where tax variables (average and marginal tax rates) are treated as
endogenous when controlling for year effects as exogenous. Before interpreting the results of the
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empirical tests, it is worth confirming numerous statistical tests that are essential when employing
a two-step system GMM estimation [87]. In Specification 1 of Table 4, the Arellano-Bond tests of
autocorrelation show that there is no serial correlation in the error terms (p = 0.186), and the number of
instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e., 8 < 18). The Hansen J-test is not significant
in the baseline model (p = 0.957), which indicates that the employed variables are appropriate
instruments and can be treated as exogenous. We now move to examining the tests of our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between downside tax progressivity and the transition
ratio. The findings provide support for hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship
between upside progressivity and the transition ratio. The findings do not support Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that only marginal tax rates are perceived by entrepreneurs in the transition
from nascent entrepreneurship to established entrepreneur. The results support Hypothesis 3.
Table 4. System Generalized Method-of-Moments (GMM; Arellano-Bond) Estimates.
Marginal Tax Rates Average Tax Rates
Specification 1 2 3 4
Downside Upside Downside Upside
Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity
Tax Progressivity 0.028 ** −0.002 −0.008 −0.013
(0.012) (0.015) (0.080) (0.052)
Tax Rate −0.013 0.018 0.057 0.004
(0.011) (0.040) (0.287) (0.042)
Transition Ratiot = −1 0.306 ** 0.128 0.217 0.146
(0.150) (0.190) (0.476) (0.254)
Observations 84 84 84 84
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Number of instruments 8 8 8 8
Wald χ2 11.376 ** 2.694 1.442 0.966
AR(1) (p-value) 0.024 0.070 0.260 0.126
AR(2) (p-value) 0.186 0.190 0.359 0.221
Hansen J-test 0.314 1.698 2.152 4.216
Hansen (p-value) 0.957 0.637 0.541 0.239
Notes: Dependent Variable is Transition Ratio. Tax Rates and Tax Progressivity Are Endogenous. The Wald χ2
test for the overall model holds (p = 0.023) in specification 1. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in Specifications
1–4 suggest that serial correlation is not a concern (p-values ranging from 0.186 to 0.359). The Hansen J-test of
over-identification of the system GMM instruments in Specifications 1–4 does not reject the null that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term (p-values ranging from 0.239 to 0.957), confirming the validity of the instruments
used in the system GMM estimation. The number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e.,
8 < 18). Windmeijer-corrected standard errors in parentheses. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In Table 4, four specifications are displayed. Specifications 1 and 2 use a two-step system GMM
estimation with tax rates and progressivity measured using the net personal marginal tax rates
(marginal tax rates). The results in Specification 1 suggest that downside progressivity positively
affects switching from nascent entrepreneurship to established entrepreneur (β = 0.029; p = 0.016).
This means that increasing downside progressivity by 35 units increases the rate of transition to
entrepreneur by about one point. Put differently, a 1-unit increase in downside progressivity increases
the rate of transition to entrepreneur by about 0.03 units. Additionally, the coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.306; p = 0.041). This supports our
choice of the two-step system GMM estimator, because the current transition ratio depends on its own
past realizations.
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In specification 2, upside progressivity has an insignificant effect on the transition to the established
entrepreneurs from the nascent entrepreneurship (β = −0.002; p = 0.903). Thus, hypothesis 2 is
not supported.
Tax rates and tax progressivity are calculated with net personal average tax rates (average tax
rates) in Specifications (3) and (4). Specifications 3 reports the results for downside progressivity at
average tax rates in the lower income range (from 67 to 100% of average earnings). Specification 4
reports the results for upside tax progressivity at average tax rates in the higher income range (from
100 to 167% of average earnings). There are no significant results for the effect of tax progressivity
on the transition from nascent to established entrepreneurs in either model (β = −0.008; p = 0.923)
and (β = −0.013; p = 0.807). These results support hypothesis 3, that prospective entrepreneurs use
marginal tax rates, and not average tax rates, when deciding to leave employment for self-employment.
In Table 5, four specifications are displayed. Specifications 5 and 6 use the two-step system GMM
estimation with marginal tax rates and progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates. We find
support for our baseline prediction that increasing downside progressivity increases transition from
nascent to established entrepreneur, reflected in the positive and significant coefficient in Specification
5 (β = 0.036; p = 0.008). This demonstrates that increasing downside progressivity by 28 units would
increase the rate of transition ratio by about one point. Put differently, a 1-unit increase in downside
progressivity would increase the rate of transition ratio by about 0.04 U. However, for tax progressivity
calculated using average tax rates, in Specifications 7 and 8 of Table 5, none of the coefficients are
statistically significant, neither downside progressivity (β = −0.006; p = 0.789) nor upside progressivity
(β = −0.028; p = 0.380). None of the explanatory variables added in specifications 5 through 8, income
and startup costs are significant. In addition, none of the control variables, credit information and
tertiary education, are significant. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and
statistically significant (β = 0.530; p = 0.041) for Specification 5, but not Specifications 6 through 8.
Table 5. Robustness checks, System GMM (Arellano-Bond) Estimates.
Marginal Tax Rates Average Tax Rates
Specification 5 6 7 8
Downside Upside Downside Upside
Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity
Tax Progressivity 0.036 *** −0.009 −0.006 −0.028
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.032)
Tax Rate −0.016 0.015 0.024 0.002
(0.016) (0.047) (0.028) (0.014)
Log(Income) 0.804 −0.519 0.065 −0.393
(1.092) (1.416) (0.686) (0.762)
Start–Up Cost 0.002 0.005 −0.003 0.004
(0.014) (0.026) (0.035) (0.020)
Credit Information −0.041 0.101 0.046 0.037
(0.085) (0.248) (0.111) (0.060)
Tertiary Education −0.003 0.002 −0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004)
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Table 5. Cont.
Marginal Tax Rates Average Tax Rates
Specification 5 6 7 8
Transition Ratiot = −1 0.530 ** 0.235 0.303 0.208
(0.259) (0.190) (0.387) (0.335)
Observations 84 84 84 84
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Number of instruments 14 14 14 14
Wald χ2 81.213 *** 17.893 ** 15.540 ** 29.145 ***
AR(1) (p-value) 0.031 0.090 0.239 0.229
AR(2) (p-value) 0.595 0.361 0.477 0.401
Hansen J-test 1.644 7.680 6.534 5.148
Hansen (p-value) 0.896 0.175 0.258 0.398
Notes: The Dependent Variable is the Transition Ratio. Tax Rates, Tax Progressivity, Income and Start Cost
Are Endogenous; Credit Info and Education Are Exogenous. The Wald χ2 test for the overall model holds in
Specifications 5–8 (p < 0.05). The Arellano-Bond tests for AR(2) in Specifications 5–8 suggest that serial correlation
is not a concern (p-values ranging from 0.361 to 0.595). The Hansen J-test of over-identification of the system
GMM instruments in Specifications 5–8 does not reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term (p-values ranging from 0.175 to 0.896), confirming the validity of the instruments used in the system GMM
estimation. The number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e., 14 < 18). Windmeijer-corrected
standard errors in parentheses. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Following [16] and [17], we run a second set of robustness checks by adding income-squared
and risk to the previous models. Table 6 displays the results for the second set of robustness checks
in Specifications 9 to 12. While Specifications 9 and 10 use the two-step system GMM estimation
with tax rates and tax progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates. Specifications 11 and
12 use average tax rates and progressivity calculated using average tax rates. In Specification 9,
the results for downside progressivity are essentially the same as in Specification 1. The coefficient on
downside progressivity is positive and significant (β = 0.028; p < 0.001), which shows that the baseline
model results hold, even after controlling for the other variables of interest. Increasing downside
progressivity by 36 units would increase the rate of transition ratio by about one point. Put differently,
a 1-unit increase in downside progressivity would increase the rate of transition ratio by about 0.03
U. In Specification 10, the coefficient on upside progressivity is not significant (β = −0.005; p = 0.668).
When tax rates and tax progressivity are calculated using average tax rates, downside tax progressivity
is not significant (β = −0.008; p = 0.765), and upside tax progressivity is not significant (β = 0.038;
p = 0.599). Past entrepreneurial dynamics continue to indicate a strong, positive, and statistically
significant relation (β = 0.451; p < 0.001).
In Table 7, we report the results of our final robustness checks. We continue the analysis
by incorporating government subsidies and inflation into the models used previously. In Table 7,
four specifications are presented. Specifications 13 and 14 employ the two-step system GMM estimation
with tax rates and tax progressivity calculated using marginal tax rates. Specification 15 and 16 use
average tax rates and progressivity calculated using average tax rates. As expected, in Specification 13
of Table 7, the regression coefficient on downside progressivity is positive and significant (β = 0.027;
p < 0.001) and yields results that are robust with respect to the baseline model (Specification 1). Thus,
the results from the two-step system GMM estimation appear to strongly support hypothesis 1,
suggesting that increasing downside progressivity by 37 units would increase the rate of transition
ratio by about one point. Put differently, a 1-unit increase in downside progressivity would increase
the rate of transition ratio by about 0.03 U. In Specification 14, the coefficient on upside progressivity is
not significant (β = −0.003; p = 0.840). When tax progressivity is calculated using average tax rates,
as shown in Specifications 15 and 16, the tax progressivity variables do not display any effect on the rate
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of transition ratio, which is consistent with the previous results. In Specification 13, the marginal tax
rate at 100% of average earnings is negative and statistically significant (β = −0.015; p = 0.058). Prior
period entrepreneurial dynamics continue to indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship
with the rate of transition ratio (β = 0.382; p = 0.016).
Table 6. Robustness checks, System GMM (Arellano-Bond) Estimates.
Marginal Tax Rates Average Tax Rates
Specification 9 10 11 12
Downside Upside Downside Upside
Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity
Tax Progressivity 0.028 *** −0.005 −0.008 −0.037
(0.009) (0.012) (0.027) (0.071)
Tax Rate −0.015 * 0.000 0.021 0.015
(0.009) (0.042) (0.040) (0.015)
Log(Income) 4.104 29.820 * 21.135 54.587
(3.378) (16.476) (16.272) (70.867)
Log(Income)2 −0.182 −1.395* −0.987 −2.563
(0.165) (0.775) (0.768) (3.331)
Start–Up Cost 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.012
(0.009) (0.021) (0.028) (0.032)
Credit Information −0.022 −0.013 0.038 −0.02
(0.028) (0.245) (0.159) (0.196)
Tertiary Education 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Risk 0.030 0.000 −0.013 0.016
(0.032) (0.051) (0.031) (0.044)
Transition Ratiot = −1 0.451 *** 0.132 0.273 0.108
(0.123) (0.145) (0.561) (0.477)
Observations 84 84 84 84
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Number of instruments 17 17 17 17
Wald χ2 1799.336 *** 44.008 *** 61.573 *** 39.282 ***
AR(1) (p-value) 0.031 0.078 0.384 0.484
AR(2) (p-value) 0.514 0.297 0.542 0.357
Hansen J-test 5.157 7.670 8.153 15.622
Hansen (p-value) 0.524 0.263 0.227 0.016
Notes: Dependent Variable is Transition Ratio. Tax Rates, Tax Progressivity, Income, Income Squared, and Start Cost
Are Endogenous; Credit Info, Education, and Risk Are Exogenous. The Wald χ2 test for the overall model holds in
Specifications 9–12 (p < 0.01). The Arellano-Bond tests for AR(2) in Specifications 9–12 suggest that serial correlation
is not a concern (p-values ranging from 0.297 to 0.542). The Hansen J-test of over-identification of the system GMM
instruments in Specifications 9–11 does not reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term (p-values ranging from 0.227 to 0.524), confirming the validity of the instruments used in the system GMM
estimation. The number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e., 17 < 18). Windmeijer-corrected
standard errors in parentheses. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7. Robustness checks, System GMM (Arellano-Bond) Estimates.
Marginal Tax Rates Average Tax Rates
Specification 13 14 15 16
Downside Upside Downside Upside
Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity Progressivity
Tax Progressivity 0.027 *** −0.003 −0.013 0.006
(0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022)
Tax Rate −0.015 * −0.010 −0.013 0.002
(0.008) (0.035) (0.027) (0.022)
Log (Income) 0.449 −0.915 −0.434 −1.078
(1.131) (1.626) (0.749) (0.807)
Start–Up Cost 0.003 0.013 0.010 −0.003
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014)
Subsidies 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.011 **
(0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005)
Credit Information −0.033 0.014 0.010 0.060
(0.059) (0.228) (0.050) (0.087)
Tertiary Education −0.001 0.007 0.005 0.004
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation −0.020 0.016 0.002 0.022
(0.042) (0.065) (0.032) (0.032)
Transition Ratiot = −1 0.382 ** 0.164 0.229 0.215
(0.159) (0.132) (0.166) (0.138)
Observations 84 84 84 84
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Number of instruments 17 17 17 17
Wald χ2 90.747 *** 98.717 *** 41.073 *** 564.475 ***
AR(1) (p-value) 0.037 0.028 0.074 0.097
AR(2) (p-value) 0.249 0.353 0.316 0.388
Hansen J-test 3.169 7.170 5.904 3.783
Hansen (p-value) 0.787 0.305 0.434 0.706
Notes: Dependent Variable is Transition Ratio. Tax Rates, Tax Progressivity, Income, Start Cost, and Subsidies Are
Endogenous; Credit Info, Education, and Inflation Are Exogenous. The Wald χ2 test for the overall model holds
in Specifications 13–16 (p < 0.01). The Arellano-Bond tests for AR(2) in Specifications 13–16 suggest that serial
correlation is not a concern (p-values ranging from 0.249 to 0.388). The Hansen J-test of over-identification of the
system GMM instruments in Specifications 13–16 does not reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term (p-values ranging from 0.305 to 0.787), confirming the validity of the instruments used in the
system GMM estimation. The number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e., 17 < 18).
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors in parentheses. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Using macro data across 18 countries from 2002 to 2007, we investigate the effect of tax progressivity
on the rate of transition (conversion) from a state of “nascent entrepreneurship” to a state of “established
business.” Three main hypotheses were proposed and tested. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive
relationship between downside tax progressivity and the transition ratio. The findings provide support
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for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship between upside progressivity and the
transition ratio. The findings do not support Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 predicts that only marginal
tax rates are perceived by entrepreneurs in the transition from nascent entrepreneurship to established
entrepreneur. The results support Hypothesis 3.
The implication for policymakers is that to encourage entrepreneurial activity, they should
maximize downside progressivity in marginal tax rates. However, the opportunity to change
progressivity is constrained by the current levels of tax rates and progressivity. For example, in 2005,
Ireland had a low transition ratio of 0.28. To try to increase this by increasing downside progressivity
from the current level of 2.0 requires decreasing marginal tax rates at the lower levels of income,
or increasing tax rates at higher levels of income. However, in 2005, Ireland already had one of
the lowest marginal tax rates at 67% of average income (at 24% the second lowest in the sample
countries after Japan). It might not be possible to decrease the already low tax rates at low levels
of income, and policymakers are not likely to increase tax rates at higher levels of income due to
the potential dampening effect higher tax rates might have on entrepreneurship [12,13,37,46,47].
These conditions give Ireland less flexibility in setting policy to encourage entrepreneurship through
increasing downside progressivity.
The second example of a country with a low transition rate from nascent entrepreneurship to
entrepreneurship is Belgium, with a 0.14 transition ratio in 2006 and 0.08 in 2007. This is also two years
when Belgium had negative downside progressivity and high marginal tax rates. At 67% of average
earnings, the marginal labor tax rate faced by a single person with no children was 61.3% in 2006 and
61.4% in 2007. To achieve the average transition ratio of the sample countries in 2006, Belgium would
have to increase downside progressivity by 10.7% by reducing the tax rate faced by taxpayers at 67% of
average earnings to 50.6%. Everything else being equal, this would increase the transition ratio by 0.30.
The results also have significant implications for research on entrepreneurial dynamics. We have
demonstrated one use of the transition ratio, the importance of tax structure on entrepreneurial
dynamics. This adds to our understanding of how the structure of tax rates is more important in
explaining the transition ratio than the levels of tax rates. In many ways, this makes sense when
considered from the standpoint of the entrepreneur. A nascent entrepreneur that is still working is faced
with a current tax rate at their present level of income. When they consider giving up employment,
the tax rate they face is not something they control. If the entrepreneur is in a high tax progressivity
environment, they will consider two potential outcomes, if the new enterprise is more or less successful
than their current situation as an employee. In the first case, if the new enterprise returns less than their
current income, they will find comfort in knowing ex-ante that they will face a much lower tax rate.
This reduces the risk of leaving employment for self-employment. In the success scenario, with income
from the new enterprise above their current income as an employee, the nascent entrepreneur would,
of course, like to face a lower tax rate, but is happy that they have more after-tax income than they did
as an employee. Both scenarios in a high tax progressivity environment have something of a positive
outcome for the nascent entrepreneur. Low success is offset somewhat by low tax rates, and high
success still results in increased after-tax income.
The ideal situation for the nascent entrepreneur is high downside progressivity and low upside
progressivity. In this case, the nascent entrepreneur benefits from low tax rates in the less-successful
scenario, and in the high-success scenario tax rates close to what they were paying as an employee.
This situation is found in our sample in Norway and Sweden. For example, in 2004, Norway had
large downside progressivity of 13.5, and small upside progressivity of zero. This led to their 2004
transition ratio to be 0.89, twice the average transition ratio in our sample. Similarly, in 2003 Sweden
had downside progressivity of 16.7, and small upside progressivity of 4.6. This led to their 2003
transition ratio to be 0.71, almost twice the average. These entrepreneur-friendly tax policies make it
easier for the nascent entrepreneur to transition to become an established business owner.
Of course, tax structure is one of many factors affecting the transition rate from nascent entrepreneur
to established business owner. Due to country-specific factors associated with tax structure, there might
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be limited generalizability to other countries and time periods. Even within countries, there might
be limited generalizability due to regional, state, or provincial income taxes that cause the tax rate
faced by entrepreneurs to be significantly different from the average or statutory federal income tax
rate. Future studies can investigate other variables and conditions that have been shown to affect
levels of entrepreneurial activity and see if they also affect the transition ratio. In this study, we have
demonstrated how one of those, increasing downside progressivity, increases the transition ratio.
Our paper contributes the existing literature in two dimensions. First, our research sheds some
light on the studies showing significant cross-country variation in the relationship between tax
progressivity and the entrepreneurial process. Second, as proposed by theory, econometric analysis of
the current sample shows that downside progressivity has a positive influence on the transition rate
from nascent entrepreneurship to established business ownership.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, O.N.; methodology, O.N and B.D.; software, O.N.; validation, B.D.;
formal analysis, O.N and B.D.; investigation, O.N.; resources, O.N.; data curation, O.N.; writing—original draft
preparation, O.N and B.D.; writing—review and editing, B.D.; visualization, O.N.; supervision, B.D.; project
administration, O.N. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Smith, A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; Clarendon Press: Oxford, UK, 1976.
2. Goode, R. The income tax and the supply of labor. J. Political Econ. 1949, 57, 428–437. [CrossRef]
3. Petutschnig, M. Future orientation and taxes: Evidence from big data. J. Int. Account. Audit. Tax. 2017, 29,
14–31. [CrossRef]
4. Clingingsmith, D.; Shane, S. How individual income tax policy affects entrepreneurship. Law Rev. 2016, 84,
2495–2516.
5. Block, J. Corporate Income Taxes and Entrepreneurship. Iza World Labor. Available online: https://wol.iza.
org/uploads/articles/257/pdfs/corporate-income-taxes-and-entrepreneurship.pdf (accessed on 2 February
2020).
6. Darnihamedani, P.; Block, J.H.; Hessels, J.; Simonyan, A. Taxes, start-up costs, and innovative
entrepreneurship. Small Bus. Econ. 2018, 51, 355–369. [CrossRef]
7. Domar, E.D.; Musgrave, R.A. Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking. Q. J. Econ. 1944, 58, 388–422.
[CrossRef]
8. Kanbur, S.M. Risk taking and taxation: An alternative perspective. J. Public Econ. 1981, 15, 163–184.
[CrossRef]
9. Peck, R.M. Taxation, risk, and returns to scale. J. Public Econ. 1989, 40, 319–330. [CrossRef]
10. Boadway, R.; Marchand, M.; Pestieau, P. Optimal linear income taxation in models with occupational choice.
J. Public Econ. 1991, 46, 133–162. [CrossRef]
11. Arulampalam, W.; Papini, A. Tax Progressivity and Self-Employment Dynamics. WP 18/18r; Oxford University
Centre for Business Taxation: Oxford, UK, 2018.
12. Gentry, W.M.; Hubbard, R.G. Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry. Am. Econ. Rev. 2000, 90, 283–287.
[CrossRef]
13. Gentry, W.M.; Hubbard, R.G. “Success Taxes,” Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation. Innov. Policy Econ.
2005, 5, 87–108. [CrossRef]
14. Bacher, H.U.; Brülhart, M. Progressive taxes and firm births. Int. Tax Public Financ. 2013, 20, 129–168.
[CrossRef]
15. Bruce, D.; Deskins, J. Can state tax policies be used to promote entrepreneurial activity? Small Bus. Econ.
2012, 38, 375–397. [CrossRef]
16. Baliamoune-Lutz, M.; Garello, P. Tax structure and entrepreneurship. Small Bus. Econ. 2014, 42, 165–190.
[CrossRef]
17. Baliamoune-Lutz, M. Taxes and entrepreneurship in OECD countries. Contemp. Econ. Policy 2015, 33,
369–380. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3584 19 of 21
18. Keuschnigg, C.; Bo Nielsen, S. Progressive taxation, moral hazard, and entrepreneurship. J. Public Econ.
Theory 2004, 6, 471–490. [CrossRef]
19. Kitao, S. Entrepreneurship, taxation and capital investment. Rev. Econ. Dyn. 2008, 11, 44–69. [CrossRef]
20. Gentry, W.M.; Hubbard, R.G. The effects of progressive income taxation on job turnover. J. Public Econ. 2004,
88, 2301–2322. [CrossRef]
21. Bergmann, H.; Stephan, U. Moving on from nascent entrepreneurship: Measuring cross-national differences
in the transition to new business ownership. Small Bus. Econ. 2013, 41, 945–959. [CrossRef]
22. Carland, J.W.; Hoy, F.; Boulton, W.R.; Carland, J.A.C. Differentiating entrepreneurs from small business owners:
A conceptualization. In Entrepreneurship: Concepts, Theory and Perspective; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg,
Germay, 2007; p. 73. [CrossRef]
23. Gordon, R. How should taxes be designed to encourage entrepreneurship? J. Public Econ. 2018, 166, 1–11.
[CrossRef]
24. Bruce, D. Effects of the United States tax system on transitions into self-employment. Labour Econ. 2000, 7,
545–574. [CrossRef]
25. Bruce, D. Taxes and entrepreneurial endurance: Evidence from the self-employed. Natl. Tax J. 2002, 55, 5–23.
[CrossRef]
26. Gentry, W.; Hubbard, G. Tax Policy and Entry into Entrepreneurship, Mimeograph; Columbia University:
New York, NY, USA, 2003.
27. Cullen, J.B.; Gordon, R.H. Taxes and entrepreneurial risk-taking: Theory and evidence for the US. J. Public
Econ. 2007, 91, 1479–1505. [CrossRef]
28. Blaufus, K.; Bob, J.; Hundsdoerfer, J.; Sielaff, C.; Kiesewetter, D.; Weimann, J. Perception of income tax rates:
Evidence from Germany. Eur. J. Law Econ. 2015, 40, 457–478. [CrossRef]
29. Lewis, A. The Psychology of Taxation; Martin Robertson: Oxford, UK, 1982; pp. 1–257.
30. Kirchler, E. The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2007;
pp. 1–243. [CrossRef]
31. De Bartolome, C.A. Which tax rate do people use: Average or marginal? J. Public Econ. 1995, 56, 79–96.
[CrossRef]
32. Rupert, T.J.; Fischer, C.M. An empirical investigation of taxpayer awareness of marginal tax rates. J. Am. Tax.
Assoc. 1995, 17, 36–59.
33. Hundsdoerfer, J.; Sichtmann, C. The importance of taxes in entrepreneurial decisions: An analysis of
practicing physicians’ behavior. Rev. Manag. Sci. 2009, 3, 19–40. [CrossRef]
34. Robbins, L. On the elasticity of demand for income in terms of effort. Economica 1930, 29, 123–129. [CrossRef]
35. Hicks, J.R. Value and Capital; Oxford at the Clarendon Press: London, UK, 1939.
36. Robson, M.T. The rise in self-employment amongst UK males. Small Bus. Econ. 1998, 10, 199–212. [CrossRef]
37. Robson, M.T.; Wren, C. Marginal and average tax rates and the incentives for self-employment. South. Econ.
J. 1999, 65, 757–773. [CrossRef]
38. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD Tax Database. Available online:
https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database/ (accessed on 04 October 2018).
39. International Country Risk Guide Researchers Dataset. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Researchers
Dataset. Available online: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4YHTPU (accessed on 18 October 2018).
40. World Development Indicators. GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant 2011 International $). Available online:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD (accessed on 18 October 2018).
41. World Development Indicators. Cost of Business Start-Up Procedures (% of GNI per Capita). Available
online: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.REG.COST.PC.ZS (accessed on 21 September 2018).
42. World Development Indicators. Depth of Credit Information Index (0 = low to 8 = high). Available online:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.CRD.INFO.XQ (accessed on 18 October 2018).
43. World Development Indicators. School Enrollment, Tertiary (% Gross). Available online: https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR (accessed on 18 October 2018).
44. World Development Indicators. Subsidies and Other Transfers (% of Expense). Available online: https:
//data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TRFT.ZS (accessed on 18 October 2018).
45. World Development Indicators. Inflation, GDP Deflator (Annual%). Available online: https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG (accessed on 18 October 2018).
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3584 20 of 21
46. Stabile, M. Payroll Taxes and the Decision to Be Self-employed. Int. Tax Public Financ. 2004, 11, 31–53.
[CrossRef]
47. Hansson, Å. Tax policy and entrepreneurship: Empirical evidence from Sweden. Small Bus. Econ. 2012, 38,
495–513. [CrossRef]
48. Long, J.E. Income taxation and the allocation of market labor. J. Labor Res. 1982, 3, 259–276. [CrossRef]
49. Blau, D.M. A time-series analysis of self-employment in the United States. J. Political Econ. 1987, 95, 445–467.
[CrossRef]
50. Parker, S.C. A time series model of self-employment under uncertainty. Economica 1996, 63, 459–475.
[CrossRef]
51. Schuetze, H.J. Taxes, economic conditions and recent trends in male self-employment: A Canada–US
comparison. Labour Econ. 2000, 7, 507–544. [CrossRef]
52. Cowling, M.; Mitchell, P. The evolution of UK self-employment: A study of government policy and the role
of the macroeconomy. Manch. Sch. 1997, 65, 427–442. [CrossRef]
53. Briscoe, G.; Dainty, A.; Millett, S. The impact of the tax system on self-employment in the British construction
industry. Int. J. Manpow. 2000, 21, 596–614. [CrossRef]
54. Fairlie, R.W.; Meyer, B.D. Trends in self-employment among white and black men during the twentieth
century. J. Hum. Resour. 2000, 35, 643–669. [CrossRef]
55. Stenkula, M. Taxation and entrepreneurship in a welfare state. Small Bus. Econ. 2012, 39, 77–97. [CrossRef]
56. Parker, S.C.; Robson, M.T. Explaining international variations in self-employment: Evidence from a panel of
OECD countries. South. Econ. J. 2004, 71, 287–301. [CrossRef]
57. Ovaska, T.; Sobel, R.S. Entrepreneurship in post-socialist economies. J. Priv. Enterp. 2005, 21, 8–28.
58. Van Stel, A.; Wennekers, S.; Thurik, R.; Reynolds, P.; de Wit, G. Explaining Nascent Entrepreneurship across
Countries. SCALES-paperN200301; EIM Business and Policy Research: Zoetermeer, The Netherlands, 2003.
59. Verheul, I.; Stel, A.V.; Thurik, R. Explaining female and male entrepreneurship at the country level. Entrep.
Reg. Dev. 2006, 18, 151–183. [CrossRef]
60. Lucas, R.E., Jr. On the size distribution of business firms. Bell J. Econ. 1978, 9, 508–523. [CrossRef]
61. Noorderhaven, N.; Thurik, R.; Wennekers, S.; Van Stel, A. The Role of Dissatisfaction and per Capita Income
in Explaining Self–Employment across 15 European Countries. Entrep. Theory Pract. 2004, 28, 447–466.
[CrossRef]
62. Bjørnskov, C.; Foss, N.J. Economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity: Some cross-country evidence. Public
Choice 2008, 134, 307–328. [CrossRef]
63. Wennekers, S.; Thurik, R.; van Stel, A.; Noorderhaven, N. Uncertainty avoidance and the rate of business
ownership across 21 OECD countries, 1976–2004. J. Evol. Econ. 2007, 17, 133–160. [CrossRef]
64. Fonseca, R.; Lopez-Garcia, P.; Pissarides, C.A. Entrepreneurship, start-up costs and employment. Eur. Econ.
Rev. 2001, 45, 692–705. [CrossRef]
65. Fonseca, R.; Michaud, P.C.; Sopraseuth, T. Entrepreneurship, wealth, liquidity constraints, and start-up costs.
Comp. Labor Law Policy J. 2006, 28, 637–674.
66. Millán, J.M.; Congregado, E.; Román, C. Determinants of self-employment survival in Europe. Small Bus.
Econ. 2012, 38, 231–258. [CrossRef]
67. King, R.G.; Levine, R. Finance, entrepreneurship and growth. J. Monet. Econ. 1993, 32, 513–542. [CrossRef]
68. Aghion, P.; Fally, T.; Scarpetta, S. Credit constraints as a barrier to the entry and post-entry growth of firms.
Econ. Policy 2007, 22, 732–779. [CrossRef]
69. Baliamoune-Lutz, M.; Brixiová, Z.; Ndikumana, L. Credit Constraints and Productive Entrepreneurship in
Africa; William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 1025; William Davidson Institute at the University of
Michigan: Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 2011.
70. Audretsch, D.B.; Feldman, M.P. R & D spillovers and the geography of innovation and production. Am. Econ.
Rev. 1996, 86, 630–640. [CrossRef]
71. Fritsch, M.; Schroeter, A. Why does the effect of new business formation differ across regions? Small Bus.
Econ. 2011, 36, 383–400. [CrossRef]
72. Audretsch, D.B.; Belitski, M. The missing pillar: The creativity theory of knowledge spillover entrepreneurship.
Small Bus. Econ. 2013, 41, 819–836. [CrossRef]
73. Belitski, M.; Chowdhury, F.; Desai, S. Taxes, corruption, and entry. Small Bus. Econ. 2016, 47, 201–216.
[CrossRef]
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3584 21 of 21
74. Nziramasanga, M.; Lee, M. Duration of Self-employment in Developing Countries: Evidence from Small
Enterprises in Zimbabwe. Small Bus. Econ. 2001, 17, 239–253. [CrossRef]
75. Taylor, M.P. Survival of the fittest? An analysis of self-employment duration in Britain. Econ. J. 1999, 109,
140–155. [CrossRef]
76. Dahl, M.S.; Reichstein, T. Are you experienced? Prior experience and the survival of new organizations.
Ind. Innov. 2007, 14, 497–511. [CrossRef]
77. Georgellis, Y.; Sessions, J.; Tsitsianis, N. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of self-employment survival.
Q. Rev. Econ. Financ. 2007, 47, 94–112. [CrossRef]
78. He, C. Inflation, Entrepreneurship and Growth; Unpublished Manuscript; 2011.
79. Young, E.C.; Welsch, H.P. Major elements in entrepreneurial development in central Mexico. J. Small Bus.
Manag. 1993, 31, 80–85.
80. Horwitz, S. The costs of inflation revisited. Rev. Aust. Econ. 2003, 16, 77–95. [CrossRef]
81. Djankov, S.; Ganser, T.; McLiesh, C.; Ramalho, R.; Shleifer, A. The effect of corporate taxes on investment and
entrepreneurship. Am. Econ. J. Macroecon. 2010, 2, 31–64. [CrossRef]
82. Arellano, M.; Bond, S. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application
to Employment Equations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1991, 58, 277–297. [CrossRef]
83. Nuscheler, D.; Engelen, A.; Zahra, S.A. The role of top management teams in transforming technology-based
new ventures’ product introductions into growth. J. Bus. Ventur. 2019, 34, 122–140. [CrossRef]
84. Bennett, D.L. Infrastructure investments and entrepreneurial dynamism in the US. J. Bus. Ventur. 2019, 34,
105907. [CrossRef]
85. Tran, H.T. Institutional quality and market selection in the transition to market economy. J. Bus. Ventur. 2019,
34, 105890. [CrossRef]
86. Ferede, E. Entrepreneurship and personal income tax: Evidence from Canadian provinces. Small Bus. Econ.
2019, 1–17. [CrossRef]
87. Roodman, D. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. Stata J. 2009, 9,
86–136. [CrossRef]
88. Gonzalez-Diaz, M.; Solis-Rodriguez, V. Why do entrepreneurs use franchising as a financial tool? An agency
explanation. J. Bus. Ventur. 2012, 27, 325–341. [CrossRef]
89. Alessandri, T.M.; Seth, A. The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification:
Balancing incentives and risks. Strateg. Manag. J. 2014, 35, 2064–2075. [CrossRef]
90. Fritsch, M.; Changoluisa, J. New business formation and the productivity of manufacturing incumbents:
Effects and mechanisms. J. Bus. Ventur. 2017, 32, 237–259. [CrossRef]
91. Roodman, D. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxf. Bull. Econ. Stat. 2009, 71, 135–158.
[CrossRef]
92. Albaladejo, I.P.; González-Martínez, M.I.; Martínez-García, M.P. Nonconstant reputation effect in a dynamic
tourism demand model for Spain. Tour. Manag. 2016, 53, 132–139. [CrossRef]
93. Nickell, S. Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econom. J. Econom. Soc. 1981, 49, 1417–1426. [CrossRef]
94. Arellano, M.; Bover, O. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models.
J. Econom. 1995, 68, 29–51. [CrossRef]
95. Blundell, R.; Bond, S. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J. Econom.
1998, 87, 115–143. [CrossRef]
96. Hansen, L.P. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. Econom. J. Econom. Soc.
1982, 50, 1029–1054. [CrossRef]
97. Suarez, F.F.; Cusumano, M.A.; Kahl, S.J. Services and the business models of product firms: An empirical
analysis of the software industry. Manag. Sci. 2013, 59, 420–435. [CrossRef]
98. Lahiri, A.; Pahnke, E.C.; Howard, M.D.; Boeker, W. Collaboration and informal hierarchy in innovation
teams: Product introductions in entrepreneurial ventures. Strateg. Entrep. J. 2019, 13, 326–358. [CrossRef]
99. Windmeijer, F. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators.
J. Econom. 2005, 126, 25–51. [CrossRef]
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
